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The ''Force de frappe'' (French for: strike force), or ''Force de dissuasion'' after 1961〔Gunston, Bill. Bombers of the West. New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons; 1973. p104〕 , is the designation of what used to be a triad of air-, sea- and land-based nuclear weapons intended for ''dissuasion'', the French term for deterrence. The French Nuclear Force, part of the Armed Forces of France, is the third largest nuclear-weapons force in the world, following the nuclear triads of the Russian Federation and the United States. France deactivated all landbased nuclear missiles. On 27 January 1996, France conducted its last nuclear test (in the South Pacific) before signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. In March 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy confirmed reports giving the actual size of France's nuclear arsenal and he announced that France will reduce its French Air Force-carried nuclear arsenal by 30%, leaving the ''Force de Frappe'' with 290 warheads. In addition to its nuclear military programme, France has a large peaceful nuclear programme and ranks as one of the world's largest generators of nuclear power. == History == The decision to arm France with nuclear weapons was made in 1954 by the administration of Pierre Mendès-France under the Fourth Republic.〔Gunston, Bill. Bombers of the West. New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons; 1973. p103〕 President Charles de Gaulle, upon his return to power in 1958, solidified the initial vision into the well-defined concept of a fully independent ''Force de Frappe'' capable of protecting France from a Soviet or other foreign attack, independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which President de Gaulle considered to be dominated by the United States to an unacceptable degree. In particular, France was concerned that in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, the US—already bogged down in the War in Vietnam and afraid of Soviet retaliation against the United States proper—would not come to the aid of its Allies in Western Europe. According to de Gaulle, France should never trust its defense and therefore its very existence to a foreign and thus unreliable protector.〔 The strategic concept behind the ''Force de Frappe'' is one of countervalue, i.e., the capacity to inflict so much damage on a potential (and more powerful) adversary's population that it will be deterred from attacking (see Mutual Assured Destruction). This principle is usually referred to in French political debate as ''dissuasion du faible au fort'' (''Weak-to-strong deterrence'') and was summarized in a statement attributed to President de Gaulle himself: General Pierre Marie Gallois said "Making the most pessimistic assumptions, the French nuclear bombers could destroy ten Russian cities; and France is not a prize worthy of ten Russian cities." 〔Gunston, Bill. Bombers of the West. New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons; 1973. p105〕 In his book ''La paix nucléaire'' (1975), French Navy Admiral Marc de Joybert explained deterrence as: While not referred to as such, the French nuclear posture of the time bears some significant similarities to other common policies of the era such as Mutually Assured Destruction and Massive Retaliation. It remains unknown whether the French government ever seriously considered their policy different from other NATO member strategies, or if their public statements were more aimed to improve morale and confidence in the French population. Certainly France's position in the 1960s and 70's required some changes in posture. After the French withdrawal from the integrated command structure of NATO to pursue their own defense systems, their position with their NATO allies was less clear. Equally both the French government and the French public took pride in their independence from US control and their ability to defend their own interests without NATO aid, even against the Warsaw Pact if necessary. As a result statements of nuclear policy spoke of a confrontation with Russia directly and without allied support, even though this was hugely unlikely as France remained in NATO. However no matter the scenario it would have been extremely impolitic for France to imply they wouldn't join a wider NATO war (instead waiting for a threat on their own soil) or to say that they would use nuclear weapons against West Germany, Italy or Belgium; the only places where Soviet forces could be advancing on France from. It may seem on the surface that an avowed policy of attacking civilians was a significant departure from the typical nuclear policies of the time, but it was not uncommon for states to refer to their nuclear abilities in terms of numbers of cities destroyed, and given the power of hydrogen bombs it is unclear how different attacks on populations and military forces would be in practice. Perhaps the most significant difference in French strategy is that it includes the option of a first strike attack even in response to non-nuclear provocation. France carried out its first test of an atomic bomb in Algeria in 1960 and some operational French nuclear weapons became available in 1964. Then, France executed its first test of the much more powerful hydrogen bomb over its South Pacific Ocean test range in 1968. President de Gaulle's vision of the ''Force de Frappe'' featured the same triad of air-based, land-based and sea-based weapons deployed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Work on these components had started in the late 1950s and was accelerated as soon as de Gaulle became the President of France. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Force de dissuasion」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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